Are mature stores actually growing?
№ 112 · Same-store sales growth (LFL)
Definition
MetricLike-for-like sales growth
Unit% YoY change in sales from stores trading at least 12 months
Line of like-for-like sales % growth (excluding new stores). Best measure of organic performance. Build by comparing stores open more than 12 months in both periods. New-store growth can mask underlying decline; LFL strips it out. Example: -2.4% Q1, +1.2% Q2, +3.8% Q3 (recovery).
- LFL
- Like for like. Sales compared only across stores open in both periods, removing the effect of openings and closures.
Benchmarks
| Bottom 30% | Median | Top 30% |
|---|---|---|
| 0% or negative | +1.5% to +2.5% | +4.0% or better |
Multi-store chain retail, developed markets, nominal value LFL on stores trading at least twelve months, digital excluded from the comp base, 2024 to mid 2026 · These are nominal values, not volumes. The BRC-KPMG series measures spend and does not adjust for price, so with food inflation running through 2025 and 2026 a nominal +2% comp can be a real-terms decline. The single most common definitional break is digital: Target reports store comps and digital comps separately, Walmart folds ecommerce into the comp and it contributed roughly 3.5 of its 4.5 points in Q2 2025. Comparing a retailer that includes click-and-collect in store comps against one that does not is meaningless. Second break is fleet rationalisation, where closing weak stores lifts the comp arithmetically without any store improving. The long-run BRC-KPMG average of 1.94% since 1995 is the most defensible central anchor because it spans thirty years of the same panel definition.
| Category | Bottom 30% | Median | Top 30% |
|---|---|---|---|
| Food and grocery | +1.0% | +2.9% | +4.5% |
| Non-food general merchandise | -2.0% | 0% to -0.5% | +2.5% |
| Off-price and value | +1.0% | +3.0% | +5.0% |
| Restaurants and food service | -2.5% | +0.5% to +1.0% | +5.0% |
When it looks bad
The total sales line keeps climbing while the LFL bars sit flat or below zero, which means the chain is buying growth with new floor space rather than earning it from the estate it already owns.
Total sales +9% on 14 net new stores, LFL -1.2%, transactions -3.1%, average ticket +1.9%. Growth is entirely footprint and price, and the underlying customer base is shrinking.
What to do about it
- Decompose every comp into traffic and ticket before acting, because the two need opposite fixes. An October 2025 restaurant industry comp of +0.7% concealed a 2.0% traffic decline, meaning price was carrying the whole line (GrowthFactor). If traffic is the negative leg, spend on catchment and hours, not on price.
- Report store comps and digital comps on separate series rather than one blended number. Target's Q4 FY24 split showed digital +8.7% against store -0.5%, a nine point spread that a blended figure would have hidden entirely (Winvesta on public disclosures). Blending lets a healthy online line mask a dying floor.
- Strip closures out of the comp base and publish the closure-adjusted number alongside the reported one. When a chain closes its worst stores the survivors redefine the base and comps improve arithmetically, so a comp that turns positive in the same year as a fleet rationalisation should be assumed to be partly accounting (GrowthFactor).
- Hold a rolling twelve-month LFL average next to the monthly bars. The BRC-KPMG series has averaged 1.94% across thirty years, so single months swinging four or five points are usually weather, holiday timing, or a comparison base, not a trend worth restructuring around.
Sources
- British Retail Consortium and KPMG Like-for-like sales strip out floor space expansion. UK LFL was +0.7% YoY in February 2026 and +2.3% in January 2026, with food +2.9% and non-food -0.4% in February. brc.org.uk ↗
- Trading Economics (BRC series) The series has averaged 1.94% since 1995, with an all-time high of 39.6% in April 2021 and a record low of -4.9% in November 2019. tradingeconomics.com ↗
- NRSInsights (National Retail Solutions) Same-store sales rose 5.7% YoY in October 2025 while units sold rose only 1.3%, and the average price paid on the top 500 items rose 3.0%. barchart.com ↗
- LSEG Lipper Alpha Insight Lowe's posted +1.3% same-store sales against a 0.4% estimate, TJX posted +5.0%, and Home Depot average ticket rose 2.4% on mix and price. lipperalpha.refinitiv.com ↗
- National Restaurant Association 50% of operators reported higher same-store sales between May 2025 and May 2026, 33% reported a decline, leaving a modest net positive. restaurant.org ↗
- GrowthFactor McDonald's closed 2025 with US comps +6.8% in Q4 on positive guest counts, Chipotle posted full-year comps of -1.7% and Q4 -2.5%, and an October 2025 restaurant industry comp of +0.7% masked a 2.0% traffic decline. growthfactor.ai ↗
- Winvesta Target reported digital comps of +8.7% against store comps of -0.5% in Q4 FY24, and Walmart's ecommerce contributed roughly 3.5 points of its 4.5% comp in Q2 2025. winvesta.in ↗
- Voyado Comparable periods must be matched year on year to avoid seasonal distortion, and quarterly is the standard reporting cadence for retail comps. voyado.com ↗
- The Motley Fool Comps cover stores trading at least twelve months and isolate organic growth from footprint growth, decomposing into traffic and average basket. fool.com ↗
- Capital One Shopping Research US brick-and-mortar retail sold $6.088 trillion in 2025, worldwide physical retail rose 2.95% to an estimated $24.9 trillion, and physical stores held 79.5% of worldwide retail sales. capitaloneshopping.com ↗